What’s the Deal With a Change in Food Aid?

Hello all!

Welcome to another edition of “What’s the Deal?” the blog that doesn’t realize it reduces the value of local blog production.

In this week’s post, we’ll go over a section of President Obama’s proposed FY 2014 Budget that he released back in April concerning changes in funding for food aid from the United States. The food aid reform, like any proposed change in the U.S. has its heavy supporters and detractors and is unlikely to be a part of the nation’s actual budget for fiscal year 2014.

We’ll take a look at how and why the United States has become the world’s biggest food aid distributor and funder, and what reform would mean for the participants of the process.

The Current

This year, I propose we try and run the government

On April 10, President Obama released his FY 2014 Budget proposal to Congress which laid out his administration’s plan on how to pay for and run the Federal government for the upcoming fiscal year. In his budget proposal, the President laid out many plans familiar to people who have followed politics in the last four years such as raising taxes, investing in infrastructure, and cutting government spending in certain areas. While these parts of the budget have been getting significant coverage, it is a small portion of the budget which has caused a bit of a stir here in the U.S. and abroad. This small portion is the funding allocated to food aid: a policy started in the 1960′s to sell surplus American food production to the hungry around the world.

President Obama has put forth a reform to food aid funding to improve it. Several long term problems have come to light on the food aid policy of the United States which have left glaring needs for change. The first is inefficiency: food purchased for aid distribution must be bought mostly from American farms and shipped by American ships; a requirement that takes up nearly 16% of the main food aid program budget. Shipping is also an inefficient method for distribution: shipping from the U.S. can take 10 – 14 weeks to arrive at its intended destination than shipping from local distributors.

Container speed!

The second need for reform is the controversial practice called “monetization” which is a program where U.S. food aid is given to NGOs and international charities to sell abroad. Monetization is a big loser economically, losing 25 cents / dollar according to a study done by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and poses a major development problem by undermining local food markets with cheaper products.

The administration proposes several solutions to these problems. The first is a direct end to monetization; a program which has come under severe scrutiny from development experts (CARE, an international NGO decided to end the practice, even though it raked in a great deal of money for them). To eliminate the inefficiencies of shipping, the food aid reform includes a variety of sourcing options including local & regional purchase options and electronic vouchers.

The issues with food aid that the administration aims to tackle are relatively minuscule compared to the log jams of revenue and spending cuts currently being debated by our representatives. But it is worth visiting why these policies were put in place if they had such a negative result for aid recipients.

We’re calling it Food for Peace, man

The growth of international assistance from the United States blossomed out of the successes of the Marshall Plan – the financial and technical assistance to war-torn Europe administered by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall from 1947 – 1952. Early programs were facilitated by multiple departments of the executive branch and aimed to reduce poverty and foster growth under capitalist economies (to combat the “threat” of Communist influence). These early programs set forth development efforts as part of American foreign policy.

President Kennedy recognized the need to unite American development work under one single agency and created USAID (United States Agency for International Development) by signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Part of Kennedy’s new USAID was a program called PL (Public Law) 480; legislation signed by President Eisenhower in 1954 to export surplus agricultural production to other countries with food shortages. Kennedy renamed the program “Food for Peace” hoping to use food aid as part of the effort in establishing connections with foreign nations.  The idea that food aid could have deleterious effects to recipient country producers was addressed in an amendment to the PL 480 food aid legislation:

“distribution of commodities in the recipient country will not result in a substantial disincentive or interference with domestic production or marketing in that country”

Now on the market!

The Food Security Act of 1985 created the Food for Progress program, a supplemental non-emergency food aid program that supported activities towards increasing local food production, processing, and marketing in countries that received food aid. What was the supporting activity? It was and still is the now controversial program of monetization. For the past 30 years, USAID has authorized NGOs, private companies, or governments to sell donated American food commodities with the profits used to fund programs that address food insecurity and increase food production.

Monetization

Initially, the program for sale, or monetization of food, was allowed just to cover shipping costs, but in 1988 was expanded to fund food security projects and later to raise cash for the McGovern-Dole International Food Education and Child Nutrition program in 2002. Since the U.S. has not had food surpluses for many years, monetization now works by having the government buy food commercially from American producers, and ship them internationally to partners (NGOs, governments, etc.) to sell.

As the GAO report showed, the monetization program was significantly inefficient and a waste economically for both the U.S. and the recipient country. The programs inefficiency is apparent: between the years 2008 – 2010, the monetization program had an average cost recovery level of only 58% and 76% for USDA and USAID respectively. This means that for every dollar of U.S. commodity (food aid item) sold, the monetization program was only recovering a portion of the total! This resulted in reduced funding for development projects (its intended purpose) by $219 M. 

Why has monetization been so inefficient in generating funds for the Food for Progress programs?

Aid for whom?

First off, both USAID and USDA only have limited monitoring of sales prices from its partners- making their influence limited on cost recovery. Ocean shipping of commodities eats up around 1/3 of the overhead costs of monetization and a requirement by the law to use American ships for 75% of the shipping makes the program expensive (not to mention time consuming). Finally, the monetization programs cannot ensure that there are no adverse local market effects (like lower commodity prices) because of weak market assessments and no post-monetization evaluations. So, monetization loses money for the U.S., doesn’t fund the programs its supposed to, and negatively affects local markets.

 Market Basket

Speaking of adverse market effects…

USAID rules stipulate that partner organizations must make sure their sale of donated U.S. food does not undermine local markets, and that it is sold at a “reasonable market price.” This rule though has not prevented food aid (both emergency & non-emergency food aid) from depressing local food prices as this report from the National Bureau of Economic Research shows.

increasing the supply

This has occurred mainly because the term “reasonable market price” is not well defined and food aid has contributed a significant portion of food to the total supply – specifically on certain grains, like wheat. While the suppression of food prices by food aid makes food cheaper for both poor and rich alike, this is a disincentive for local producers (by lowering their revenue). Further, the relatively inefficient methods of delivery (required delivery by ship) and logistics often result in untimely distribution of food aid – which can radically change prices during harvest and lean seasons.

Food Aid: Make it efficient to help more people

Food for Peace works by paying American farmers for food produced specifically for aid, and then using American ships to deliver the food. When U.S. food surpluses diminished, Congress was (and still is) required to appropriate a certain amount for food aid as part of the federal budget each year. Thus, food aid has become its own coordinated industry with Federal funding from producer to distributor. The food aid policy initially aimed at helping countries with food deficiencies and making food available to the hungry, has become a slush fund for U.S. farmers and American ships.

So what should be done to solve the current issues of food aid?

The President’s proposal is attempting to move the focus back to the beneficiaries of food aid with efficiency as the central theme – USAID says the new policy could help feed 4 million more people. Obama’s proposal has taken a lot of heat from the shipping industry because of the loss in business, and the proposal is not popular with food producing states (even though subsidies are place to placate them). But more should be done in conjunction with other food policies so that the food producing capabilities and generosity of the U.S. work for both producer and recipient. This means a comprehensive farm/food bill that could make drastic changes, such as an end to biofuel requirements.

But comprehensive bills are not exactly this Congress’ forte, and most of the President’s budget (including the change to food aid) is unlikely to pass anyways. This would be a shame. A well intended policy that feeds millions of people (especially after disasters) has the potential to feed more while improving local economies. Food aid is due for a change.

Until the next wheat surplus,

Your Faithful Historian,

Eric G. Prileson

Sources and Further Reads:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/factsheet/reforming-international-food-aid

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/us/politics/white-house-seeks-to-change-international-food-aid.html

http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21576697-administration-proposes-overdue-reforms-americas-overseas-food-aid-helping-whom

http://www.usaid.gov/foodaidreform

http://foodaid.org/resources/the-history-of-food-aid/

http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320013.pdf

Does Food Aid Harm Poor Countries? National Bureau of Economic Research

What’s the Deal With Royal Outlaws in Malaysia?

Hello All!

Welcome to another edition of “What’s the Deal?” the blog that explains the Sultanate of Sulu so you don’t have to!

Sabah state: the epicenter of violence

In this week’s post, we’ll look at a fascinating small scale invasion by a rag-tag militant group from the southern Philippines into northeast Malaysia. This crusade-like adventure and violent standoff has led to full scale action by the Malaysian military and a guerrilla style standoff.

We’ll examine just exactly what is occurring in this south east asian country and how the incident is straining Filipino-Malay relations.

The Current: A Slighted Sultan

The Sultanate draws the line

On February 9, a group of 200 men with a territorial claim and a bone to pick, crossed the Sulu Sea via motor-boat from the Southern Philippines to the Sabah state of Malaysia on the northeastern part of the island of Borneo. The armed group quietly took control of the small village of Kampung Tanduo without firing a shot and claimed the Sabah State for the proclaimed Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram III.

The armed group, calling themselves the Sulu Royal Militia, is claiming the Sabah state of Malaysia actually belongs to the former rulers of the land, the Sulu kingdom. The Sultan of Sulu and his followers felt slighted for not being included in land agreements in an October 2012 peace treaty between the Philippines and another Islamic rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

the fight intensifies

As the incident unfolded over the past month, the swashbuckling has turned into full scale combat as the rebels ignored demands from both the Philippines and Malaysia to leave Sabah.

The skirmish then turned very nasty as 27 people including 8 Malaysian police were killed in ambush attacks by the Sulu Royal Militia in the first week of March, causing the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak to call the Malaysian military into action to forcefully remove the rebels. Even after air strikes and ground forces had retaken the small villages where the Sulu had taken cover, the rebels remain in Sabah – entrenched in a sporadic guerrilla fight which has now taken 78 lives.

Kiram calls for the ceasefire

To make matters worse, the aforementioned Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), that had previously sought independence from the Philippines, has apparently joined the fight with the rebels. After calls for peace from the international community, Kiram III called for a ceasefire on March 7, but it has yet to be heeded by either side as Malaysia refuses to end their military pursuit until the Sulu militia surrenders. The Razak government has resorted to transporting locals in the conflict area to safer areas to avoid civilian bloodshed, but it is unclear how the area will return to normalcy anytime soon.

Historical Claims and Colonial Gains

The Sulu claim to Sabah, however crude, is historically accurate. The Sulu Sultanate had controlled the Sabah state and surrounding areas of the present day Philippine islands between the 15th and 19th Centuries.

The Sulu came to control their southeast asian claim by marrying into another kingdom from Sumatra in modern Indonesia. Sayyid Abu Bakr Abirin, a nobleman and lawyer, married the daughter of a local chief in 1457 and developed the Sulu region into an established sultanate as a formidable maritime power around the modern day Philippine and Malay archipelagos. Sayyid became the monarch and Islamic religious leader of the Tausug people under the name of the Sulu sultanate. Sayyid’s descendents grew the monarchy to include northern Borneo and several Philippine islands.

The Sulu faced immediate pressure from European commercial expansion including the Dutch East India Company, the British North Borneo Company, and most prominently, the Spanish empire, which had control over the Philippines starting in 1521 (thanks to Magellan). The Sulu sultanate was often the victim of euro expansion, with the capital city of Jolo captured several times. The Spanish Jesuit missionaries even were successful in baptizing the Sulu Sultan in 1750, changing his name to King Ferdinand. The Spanish later attacked Sulu from Manila in 1848 and again in 1851 to capture southern Philippine islands and the island of Borneo. The peace treaty that was signed in 1851 was interpreted differently by the Sulu and by Spain and the international community – the sultan believing it was a cessation of hostilities while Spain understood the treaty meant Sulu accepted Spanish sovereignty. A 2003 review of this treaty by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observes that Sulu had relinquished over all territorial possessions to Spain.

Specifically for the island of Borneo which had been under Sulu possession until the Spanish conflict, an 1878 agreement effectively leased the Borneo territory (the area in conflict today) to the British North Borneo Company. This was cemented by the Madrid Protocol of 1885, which relinquished Spanish control over the Borneo territory to the administration of the British trading company – with the leasing payment to the Sulu.

When Malaysia won its independence from Britain in 1957, Sabah state came under the leasing control of Malaysia, which has continued to pay the yearly fee. The Sulu territory under Spanish control in the Philippines came under American control in 1902 following the Spanish-American War, and then in 1947, under Filipino control following independence for the island nation.  The sovereignty of the Philippines over the Sulu and other peoples in some of the islands has resulted in armed struggles such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fight in the southern Philippine islands and the Sulu fight today.

So legally, Sabah state and the rest of the Sulu claim is nullified by these old treaties; but this is complicated by the misinterpretations of the treaty terms and by the resulting independent states of Malaysia and the Philippines who gained Sulu territory from colonialism.

Conclusion: Just a Quixotic Adventure?

Beyond the physical fight, politics has surfaced from this skirmish-turned armed forces mission. Malaysia is facing a general election in June and the opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim, in Malaysia’s parliament is heavily criticizing Prime Minister Razak’s handling of the conflict as “weak leadership” over the lack of security. Sabah state happens to be a hotly contested political landscape and the Razak government doesn’t want to lose support from Sabah’s 800,000 mostly Filipino residents. The latest move by Malaysia to relocate Sabah residents away from the violence is a good indicator of the state’s importance.

ASEAN will have something new to talk about at its next meeting

The incident has regional implications as well. As diplomats race back and forth between Manila and Kuala Lumpur to broker a peace deal, it’s clear that the relationship between the Philippines and Malaysia is under duress due to this incident. As member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), both countries, can’t afford to lose the support of the other country. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, which is locked in their own territorial dispute with China over uninhabited islets in the South China Sea and could use a Malaysian ASEAN vote. In addition, the MILF’s involvement with the incident could threaten last year’s peace deal with the Philippines.

Some are calling Jamlul Kiram III’s claim to the Sultanate an “heir-esy”

The ‘homecoming’ of sorts for the Sultan’s supporters has also reignited a long-running dispute among Sulu over who exactly is the rightful heir to the sultanate. There were 9 heirs to the sultanate in the early 20th Century, and when Sulu lost its control of its territory, the throne was never officially designated – so controversy has persisted since then.

Some, who approve of the vigilante fight in Borneo, don’t recognize Jamalul Kiram III as the true sultanate and say Jamalul is using the act to make his title legitimate to the world. Other Sulu don’t recognize Kiram as the sultan, nor his aim to retake former land of the Sultanate by force.

Both countries must arrive at solutions which recognize the claims of the Sulu and other ethnic minorities, but also must be realistic in their negotiations. The lesson for the Philippines and Malaysia is to not wait until a violent outbreak erupts to include a group in negotiations.

Not the MILF logo you were thinking of

Whether political motives or international pressure, the Sulu have certainly stirred up quite the mess in an unusual story of adventure, history, and monarchies that are still kicking.

Until the next slighted sultan,

Your faithful historian,

Eric G. Prileson

Sources and Further Reads:

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21573148-farcical-invasion-borneo-gets-serious-and-nasty-intrusion-confusion

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/world/asia/on-borneo-malaysian-philippines-conflict-deepens.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/malaysia-philippines-najib-idUSL4N0BZ2JV20130307

http://globalnation.inquirer.net/65467/sabah-standoff-revives-questions-on-who-is-the-legitimate-sultan-of-sulu

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/milf.htm

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/097f5d66-8955-11e2-ad3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NdQSYMNS

http://www.royalsultanateofsulu.org/#!history

P. N. Abinales, Donna J. Amoroso (2005). State And Society In The Philippines State and Society in East Asia G – Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series(Illustrated ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. p. 97

International Court of Justice (2003). Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions, and Orders of the International Court of Justice, 1997-2002 Document (United Nations)

What’s the Deal With Revolutionary Justice in Bangladesh?

Hello all!

As it turned out, two Pakistans were not better than one

Welcome to another edition of “What’s the Deal?” the blog that isn’t old enough to mistakenly call Bangladesh “East Pakistan.”

In this week’s post, we’ll check in on the South Asian country of Bangladesh and attempt to figure out why hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis have taken to the streets in a massive protest.  We’ll examine several factors from the history of the country that help explain the lack of elbow room on the streets of Dhaka.

The Current: Disappointed Throngs

4 decades is a long time to wait for justice

Massive rallies in the capital city of Dhaka began to organize on February 5th after a political figure, Abdul Quader Mollah, was only given a life sentence by an International Court Tribunal.  The crowds wanted more – the death penalty.

Why would they desire this judicial outcome that would make Rick Perry smile?

It turns out that Mr. Mollah had been convicted in a Bangladeshi court for committing atrocities and war crimes during the 1971 war for independence in Bangladesh. The crowds, organized by several bloggers (not me), have turned out every day since the 5th in the tens of thousands. But the crowds were just beginning, however, for on February 16th an estimated 100,000 people came out to demand justice of the killing of an organizer of these protests, Rajib Haider. The death of the activist brought more students and workers and spread to other major cities.

Haider: Martyr from blog to casket

Mr. Mollah’s Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, is also the target of the protesters who are calling for a complete secularization of politics in Bangladesh.

The protest movements, due to their enormous size and political implications, have now garnered the support of the ruling Awami League under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the chief opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Indeed, on February 17, Bangladesh parliament made a change to a law that allows the state to appeal against the life sentence of an Islamist party leader – much to the delight of the anti-Mollah protesters – and may potentially lead to the ban of Islamist parties like Jamaat.

Supporters of Mollah and Jamaat have clashed with government security and police forces in their own protest of the court’s decisions and Parliament’s, saying they were politically motivated. These protests have been particularly violent such as in a chaotic scene on February 15th where 3 Islamist activists were shot by police and on the 22nd, when 4 more Islamist activists were killed in skirmishes with police while denouncing the bloggers as blasphemous.

Supporting war criminals as a minority group can have violent effects

Why was the turnout against the court’s decision so huge and what implications do they have for Bangladesh’s leaders and people? And why has the government turned out against Islamist parties?

This ruling is a big deal for Bangladesh, a country that is now confronting its war crimes from independence.  The reality is, Bangladesh was and still is shaped by the initial bounds of British colonial rule and its violent revolution and split from Pakistan in 1971.  To explain the massive rallies and emotional response to the rulings, we need to revisit the South Asian country’s past political upheavals and revolution.

Bengal: A Land Ruled by Foreigners

The region now known as Bangladesh shares much of its ancient and modern history with the rest of the Indian subcontinent including some history that this blog has previously covered, such as the history of the Assam state of India and of Nepal.

Don’t Lucknow, but the Mughals controlled all of the Indian subcontinent for 2 centuries

Important to the content of this blog in Bengali ancient history is the conquest of the Mauryan Empire (320 – 180 BC) and the Islamic conquest and control of India from the 12th and 18th centuries under the Mughals. Essentially, the Bengal people lived in a region already controlled by foreigners for centuries before the British expanded their economic interests to India through the British East India Company (BEIC) in the 1600s.

Fertile land and high agricultural output made Bengal one of the most profitable regions under economic control of the BEIC because the Company profited via land taxes collected by local administrators known as zamindars.

Importantly, the administrative technique of the BEIC and later the British colonial government in India and Bengal changed the structure of society from education to cultural practices – a technique that caused significant divisions and stratification between Muslims and Hindus. Hindu populations tended to adapt more readily to the changes (though not without significant resistance) than Muslim populations in Bengal. This meant positions higher in society such as tax collectors, administrators, and many military positions were given to Hindus over Muslims. As a consequence, most leaders in business and industry were Hindu, not Muslim. When Indian nationalism and representative government gained popularity, many Muslims opposed the measure because they feared a Hindu-dominated government upon the departure of the British.

Partition and Muslim Unification

Under Hindu pressure, the line didn’t take

In 1905, the British Viceroy to India, Lord Curzon (famous for drawing other famous political boundaries) decided to divide the populous Bengal region into an East and West section to “improve administrative function” (which it did in East Bengal at least, improving education).

Many Bengali Muslims favored the move as it seemed to be a recognition of their political and cultural individuality, but upper class Hindus  in Calcutta did not agree, as Curzon’s line seemed to be an attempt to prevent the Nationalist movement from gaining steam.

In 1912, the partition was voided by the British after significant lobbying by Hindus in high economic and political positions – fueling the belief that the British had acquiesced to Hindu demands. Muslim political separation gained some centralized power in the form of the Muslim League which emerged as a dominant political force in the 1940s under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah who proposed the 2 state solution of Pakistan (Muslim) and India (Hindu).

After World War II during the independence talks with Britain, massive violence from demonstrations and protests erupted from Muslims in Bengal after the Muslim League was not granted sharing power in the interim government. A resulting massacre in Calcutta forced Ghandi to arrive in Calcutta to quell uprisings in Bengal and Bihar, but they spread to other cities. When Lord Louis Mountbatten visited the scene in 1947 and found the subcontinent on the throes of civil war, he pushed Britain into supporting partition to grant full independence and stop the bloodshed -which it did.

All aboard for mass migration

Partition and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 forced a mass migration of Muslims from India into East and West Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs into India. Millions of lives were uprooted and repression and poverty were widespread as those who migrated were reintroduced into a new homeland. The two state idea was full of well intentions, but was far from a full solution.

For the newly created country (with a split East and West), things went well as long as their founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, known as the Supreme Leader (Qiad i Azam) was there. But his death in 1948 brought dysfunction as his successor, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951 by fanatics who wanted war against India.

It took the new nation of Pakistan until 1956 before a constitution was written, but already divisions between East and West over governance were arising. East Pakistan (Bengal)’s rising political parties, the Awami League and the Peasants and Social Worker’s Party centered their political platform on giving more power to East Pakistan, away from West Pakistan (which the Awami League believed should be divided up among its many tribal groups).

Ayud Khan started the Martial Law tradition

A scuffle in 1956 in East Pakistan between politicians and policemen spurred the Prime Minister to declare martial law. The new government, revamped in 1962 by the new President Ayud Khan gave much more power to himself, and made a law for the military to take over government (legalized martial law). This took a great deal of power and donor aid away from East Pakistan, straying West and East Pakistan further and influencing the political rise of a Bengali politician who advocated for an autonomous East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman (Mujib).

Mujib’s “six point plan” called for pretty much a full democracy and separate states within West Pakistan, running counter to President Ayub’s vision for central control and a unified Pakistan. During a strike in Dhaka by Mujib supporters in 1968, Mujib was arrested by Pakistani authorities. Ayub’s health deteriorated quickly and in 1970 he decided he would not run for reelection – causing mass protests and near anarchic conditions across the country. Due to this instability, Ayub’s Commander in Chief General Mohammad Yahya Khan was appointed Chief Martial law administrator and president – using that key provision from the constitution to maintain order while appointing a transitional government prior to the December 1970 election.

The tatters of Pakisani unity

A storm may have derailed any further diplomatic efforts at a unified Pakistan. A massive cyclone struck the Bay of Bengal and into East Pakistan and Bengal in November 1970 killing an estimated 250,000 people. General Yahya visited the devastated Bengal the following day, but only remained for one day and aid relief efforts were delayed in reaching Dhaka. His seeming indifference to help devastated East Pakistan caused bitter resentment. After being released from prison, Mujib somberly relayed the feeling of a country ready for a break-up: “We must make the decisions that matter. We will no longer suffer arbitrary rule by bureaucrats, capitalists, and feudal interests of West Pakistan.” 

In December, the voters of East Pakistan backed Mujib’s statements by electing his Awami Party to 160 out of 162 possible East Pakistani seats in the National Assembly. After Mujib called for 2 separate Prime Ministers for the 2 Pakistans and refused to step down from his 6 point plan, Yahya suspended the National Assembly. Mujib countered with a call for a general strike until the demands of the people’s representative were met, causing mass civil disobedience and the West Pakistani troop presence to increase dramatically in Dhaka.

Mujib’s call for independence was heeded

The War for Independence

On March 23 1971, East Pakistan celebrated a “Resistance Day” in open defiance of the unified Pakistani holiday “Republic Day”. This was enough for General Yahya who decided to end the uprising through brute force and a campaign of terror to submit the East Pakistani people to the will of the military and centralized leadership.

This they did through a horrifying campaign of torture, rape, and systematic slaughter with the help of an Islamic group, Jamaat-e-Islami – against Hindus and secular leaders. After just 3 days, an estimated 15,000 had been killed and by the end of the civil war, estimates put the loss of life between 300,000 and as high as 3 million. To disguise their actions, West Pakistan expelled the foreign press while using the West Pakistani press to deny any reports from Eastern media outlets – playing down the war as simple unrest being put down.

Justice sought for acts like this in the revolution

One Pakistani journalist, Anthony Mascarenhas went into East Pakistan to cover the slaughters and instead of submitting to Pakistani censorship, clandestinely published the chaos and tragedies of the war to the world (after safely escaping with his family to America). Horrifying accounts of rape camps show one way the Pakistani army’s attempt to physically and mentally hollow out the Bengalis – a terrorizing effect that was immediate and prolonged as women who were raped were often killed by their husbands or not accepted back into their families.

The East Pakistan Liberation Force (Mukti Bahini) held their own against the Pakistani army in many areas and in some cases used retaliatory atrocities against West Pakistan supporters. But the Pakistani Army was made vulnerable by operating in East Pakistan, being cut off geographically from their home base.

India, who had vocally condemned Pakistan’s actions, decided to act militarily, and using a pincer movement from the Northwest Indian states with a superior force in numbers and equipment was able to defeat 90,000 Pakistani defenders of Dhaka in only 12 days with the help of Liberation Force freedom fighters. Independence was declared in April and India was the first country to recognize the new country of Bangladesh after West Pakistan’s surrender in December. Mujib returned to Dhaka two months later to much fanfare and helped push his democracy oriented constitution through on four main tenants, known as Mujibism: Nationalism, Secularism, Socialism, and democracy.

Mujib: breaking his own ideology

But these four pillars were sadly eroded very quickly under Mujib. He showed favoritism for freedom fighters and enforced Bengali language and party membership in the new Peasants, Workers, and People’s League. In short, Mujib tried to force Bangladesh’s nationhood of a relatively homogeneous population in language, culture, and religion, but ended up repressing many of its citizens scarred by the war. His assassination by army officers took no one by surprise in 1975.

Martial law again was the rule for the next two years and saw political parties who either favored pro-Indian policies (Awami League/ former Mujib supporters) and those that urged closer ties with West Pakistan. A former army officer Khaleda Zia gained power and was elected in 1977 promoting swift economic changes, not discriminating against those who hadn’t participated in the revolution (unlike Mujib) and most importantly emphasized that Bangladesh would be an Islamic country, eroding Mujib’s secularism pillar. Zia’s new political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won large majorities in the Assembly in 1981.

At this time, Zia collaborated with the Jamaat-e-Islami party, who had fought against the Liberation Fighters during the war, in their jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Jamaat supporters no longer suppressed as they were under Mujib, supported Zia’s turn towards an Islamic oriented government, but overall resisted the Zia regime because their ultimate goal was a government and constitution based on sharia law.  Jamaat was and still is more of a political force in Pakistan but still has some support in Bangladesh.

President Zia couldn’t shed his military background or companions

Though Zia grew Bangladesh’s economy and restored order on a small scale, his efforts at controlling the armed and intelligence forces failed as a mutiny caused a small rebellion and  Zia was the victim of assassination in 1981 allegedly plotted by an army officer. Zia, as a former Army officer himself, had not kept the civilian and military separate, continuing the tradition of army intervention into politics and power. This was evident in Major General Ershad’s taking of power from the Vice President in 1981 in the aftermath of the Zia regime.

Ershad and following Parliamentary governments have presided over a population that struggles with extreme poverty, famine, and natural disaster. This is not a result of geography, culture, or religion but of the lasting legacy of foreign rule and the inability to create political institutions that can provide for its people and protect their rights.

The Constitution that was written under Mujib still stands (with Zia’s edits) with a Parliamentary democracy, but Bangladesh continues to struggle with high levels of corruption, executive authority and martial law when unrest is present.

Conclusion: revisiting the horrors of war

As the sentences were handed down to the Jamaat members for their crimes in the revolution in 1971, we can begin to understand why most Bangladeshis were spurred into massive protest when the sentence was not the maximum. In essence, Bangladesh is seeking closure.

Revolutionary Justice: Crimes not forgotten

But Bangladesh, though an independent country that has seen some economic growth, still lags well behind India and even Pakistan in many economic and global standings. Bangladeshi’s are relatively frustrated with their government and if they can’t make the right call on judicial rulings in revolutionary justice, than massive protests is the response.

The politics and current maelstrom of Bangladesh has many smatterings from its history:

• A fear of being controlled by foreigners: from Mauryan to Mughal to British to Hindu to West Pakistani - hence Mujib’s breakaway efforts for independence and a nationalistic idealism.
• The presence of the military in civilian government: deemed necessary to protect against foreign control, the military has served more to repress people and to depose government leaders.
•  The horrific acts of the Revolutionary War that often pitted secular, democratic leaning forces against Islamists has created resentment from the majority of Bangladeshis against Islamic politics.
• The Bangladeshi people have been unable to advance enough economically and too many people linger in the category as the poorest of the poor – a result of a lack of political institutions.

The tribunal that carried out the sentencing of Mollah and other war criminals from Bangladesh’s past has perhaps been influenced by corruption or politics, but it is the response from the government that is most interesting. The new law passed may see a backlash from the government to appeal the tribunal’s decision and may see Mollah face the death penalty. But more worrisome is the government’s violent crackdown on Jamaat supporters.

Yes, Jamaat supporters are often instigating the violence, but the government has to be careful not to once again use brute force and show favoritism – a condition that has seen negative results in the past for all Bangladeshis.

Until the next court decision that doesn’t go far enough,

Your Faithful Historian,

Eric G. Prileson

Author’s note:

You as the reader may seem inclined to believe that I have glossed over major events and details of Bangladesh’s history; this would be a correct assertion, but incomplete. This blog was an attempt to explain the emergence of a separate Bangladesh as a country – an effort that took countless lives of which the details are still being researched and uncovered. In reaching this effort, I found it necessary (however regrettable) to leave out some very important details and events.

I also could have gone further into the separation with West Pakistan and the emergence of Bhutto, and then the military regime under Musharraf, but then that would have been a history of Pakistan, which is a whole other basket.

Sources & Further Reads:

http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21570730-first-conviction-war-crimes-sparks-controversy-justice-delayed

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/world/asia/vast-throng-in-bangladesh-protests-killing-of-activist.html?_r=0

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7bC3F2C698-4DFE-4548-B5EA-B78C8D53B2BF%7d#results

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/bdtoc.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16207201

http://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/05/21/1971-rapes-bangladesh-cannot-hide-history/

http://www.bangladeshmuseum.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121&Itemid=209

The British Imperial Century, 1815-1914, by Timothy H. Parsons

A History of Bangladesh, by Willem Van Schendel

What’s the Deal With a Russian-Cozy Georgia?

Hello All!

a tasting is overdue

Welcome to another edition of “What’s the Deal?” the blog that is ready for some Caucasian wine.

In this week’s post, we’ll discuss the Russian renewal of Georgian imports and the implications of a closer relationship between the two countries.  We’ll review the history of this post-Soviet republic and the ethnic tensions and political dilemmas that create a sometimes confusing array of current events.

The Current: What do you mean Atlanta’s not the capital?

their politics may differ, but their names are both difficult to say quickly

On February 4, Russia announced that it would end a seven year ban on the import of Georgian wine – known as one of the oldest wine making regions in the world. While the glasses were still clinking, a fight broke out between protesters and politicians in Tbilisi, the capital, while Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili  was making his yearly national speech.

Saakashvili is completing the final year in his presidential term after his political party, the United National Movement Party (UNM) was defeated by the Georgian Dream party coalition led by billionaire businessman Bidzini Ivanishvili in October 2012.  In addition, a meeting with Russia in December with the new Prime Minister (Ivanishvili) sought further common ground between the two countries.

What does all this mean?

For many analysts, the thawing of Russian-Georgian relations has to do with the rise of Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his fortune after studying in Russia, and the upcoming end to the Saakashvili regime; an administration that had very hostile relations with Russia including a war in 2008. The protests (which Ivanishvili officials say was a ruse cooked up by Saakashvili) represent the continuing political turmoil that exists over an incomplete democracy.

turning the other cheek cannot always be forced

The turnaround for Georgia is surprising and a bit confusing given their recent war with Russia and the distancing from Moscow that the country’s leadership has paced following the fall of the Soviet Union.  It will be interesting to see if Ivanishvili and the new Georgian government will attempt to stray from the pro-NATO and pro-American policies of Saakashvili towards Putin’s Russia, or whether he will forge a more middle ground approach.

To get a better sense of what the politics in Georgia mean for its people and international relations, we need to examine the history behind the people and culture of this South Caucus country.  From there we can grasp what Saakashvili and Ivanishvili are facing (and maybe even pronounce their names correctly).

George-ography

An intercontinental country

The region now known as Georgia occupies a strategic location adjacent the Black Sea to the West and is a gateway to the Middle East to the South, and the Silk road to the far east past the Caspian Sea to the East.  For centuries, Georgia was a strategic trade and traveling route. Most relevant to the present, Georgia is located where a key oil pipeline traverses. This position made Georgia particularly vulnerable to many invasions and influence from different empires and cultures. Hence, Georgia’s own individual peoples and culture have many contributing recipes.

The Roman and Byzantine Empires made their influence through conquest and Christianity, Georgia was a (Christian) ally and base for European crusaders in the Middle Ages, was overrun by the Mongols in 1236 (like the rest of Asia and Eastern Europe), brought under dominion of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and then fell into an omnipresent reliance on Russia – which continues to this day.

Georgia’s Bagratuni Dynasty: under the influence of surrounding empires

Significantly, the individual culture and people were not always ruled on the whim of a foreigner – Georgia was often ruled independently through local rulers under the umbrella of a larger empire.  For example, after the Arabs invaded and sacked Tbilisi in the 7th Century, the ruling family was able to retain a great deal of independence.  This occurred again in the 17th and 18th Centuries when the long time Georgian family Bagratid was able to gain further independence within the larger Persian Empire.

It was when this independence was seriously threatened in the 18th Century from the Ottoman Turks that Georgian rulers began seeking security help from their large neighbor to the North, Russia.

Russification: A Bear is Not Easy to Lie With

If Herekle knew what Russian help would mean, would he still have accepted their help?

After Herekle II united the two major regions of Georgia in 1762, he sought protection from Russia especially after Tbilisi was sacked in 1795 by the Persians.  But with protection came a lack of control.  Tsar Alexander 1 used the strong reins of Russia’s position to gradually incorporate Georgia into the Russian Empire, used a Russian feudal system where Russian education and nobility were introduced, and Georgia lost its regional head of the Orthodox Church.  In short order, Georgia had been Russified – even though resistance to its loss of autonomy was prevalent.

In the mid 19th Century, the winds of nationalism that sparked revolution in much of Europe reached Georgia and found a receptive base as a worker class and intellectuals had begun to replace the centuries old Georgian nobility and circles of power.  With new manufacturing centers in Tbilisi and other cities, Georgia, like the rest of Russia had a common enemy in Tsarist autocracy – spouting forth in the worker revolutions of 1905 and  February 1917. Revolutionaries in Georgia and the rest of Russia were split between those who wanted gradual change (Mensheviks – literally minority) and those who wanted radical change through a full scale revolution (Bolsheviks – majority) led in Georgia by the striking figure of Ioseb Jugashvili, aka Josef Stalin.

Ioseb Jughashvili would grow into his mustache as Josef Stalin

After Russia essentially dropped out of WWI (abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, huge losses, etc..) and the Bolsheviks had claimed power in under Lenin in Moscow and St. Petersburg in November 1917, Georgia declared independence from the new Soviet Union in 1918 which was initially recognized by Lenin and the rest of Europe.  But the war and the loss of economic relations with Russia struck Georgia particularly hard as they lost their biggest trading partner and had failed to reestablish relations with the West or its neighbors.

The civil war in Russia between the White Army led by the Russian army officers and the Red Army (Bolshevik revolutionary forces) was fought throughout the Russian Empire including Georgia and the Red Army victory and the Georgian Bolsheviks undermining the Georgian Menshevik leadership eventually brought Georgia back into Soviet control in 1921.  Between 1921 – 1936, Georgia was part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (together with Armenia and Azerbaijan) but then split up as separate Republics as part of the USSR until the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Soviet Legacy in Georgia

The 72 years under Soviet rule left many issues when Georgia declared independence (again), but perhaps the most striking was the repression of minorities within Georgia by Stalin which was continued by successive Soviet Georgian leaders.  Stalin and his chief of secret police Lavrentia Beria (also from Georgia) purged a great deal of intellectuals and Georgian nobles in the 1930s who had favored the Mensheviks.  Positions of power in the Communist Party were given to Georgians over other minorities as many such as Ossetians, Abkhazians, and others were repressed.  But Stalin’s legacy in Georgia maintained an elevated status until the end of the Soviet period when the truth about his crimes against his fellow Georgians became known.

Shevardnadze called for less corruption

Though a positive figure came to power in Georgia in 1972 named Edward Shevardnadze rooted out a great deal of corruption and notably diffused a crisis between Georgia and Abkhazian minority, increased nationalism at the end of the Soviet period brought a huge rift between Tbilisi and Moscow.  Resistance against glasnost and Moscow’s effort to placate minority groups in Georgia incensed ethnic minorities and led to armed struggle in 1992 between Abkhazians and Georgian armed forces.

Republic of Georgia

Shevardnadze was elected to head the military council during the chaos of the war in the early 1990s that saw Georgian security forces attempt to put down separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (both autonomous republics).  With Russian military support, Georgian forces were actually defeated, causing an embarrassing retreat and exodus for Georgian civilians from Abkhazia.   This defeat and Shevardnadze’s use of force to quell democratic movements made him quite unpopular and weakened the influence of Tbilisi. Russians at the same time accused Georgia of supporting the separatist movement in Chechnya.

The United States became involved in a campaign to involve Georgia in NATO, much to the chagrin of Russia, and used special forces to train Georgian soldiers, sent a great deal of foreign aid, and was seen as a counter balance to Russia in the Transcaucuses region – perhaps due to Georgia’s securing of an oil pipeline traversing from the Caspian to the Black Sea.

They wish to remain autonomous

The most important political events in independent Georgia’s history occurred when popular protests, against the flawed reelection of Shevardnadze forced him to resign in 2003′s Rose Revolution. In a follow up election, our friend from earlier, Mikhail Saakashvili was elected under his party, the National Movement of Democrats.

The Rose Revolution brought huge expectations for increased openness and democratic rights, but quick changes came at the price of big expanses of executive power. Saakashvili’s government had to focus on state building (securing the borders and sovereignty of the Georgian state) which meant attempting to govern over areas under ethnic minority control (helped by their Russian backers).

The Rose Revolution brought the American flag into the picture

Georgia continued its effort to be involved with NATO and maintained its positive relationship with the United States, supporting the Iraq War and contributing troops. Russia’s continued support of ethnic minorities within Georgia, air-space violations, and maintained a military garrison as a peacekeeper strained the relationship initially between President Vladimir Putin and then his successor Dmitry Medvedev.

In August 2008, Georgia launched a full scale military campaign into South Ossetia and Abkhazia to reclaim the territory for Georgia and the Georgian peoples living there. Russia, who had supported the separatist governments of Ossetia and Abkhazia against the Georgian government moved in to defend the Georgian move – marking the beginning of a 5 day war known as the Russia-Georgia War of 2008.

After helping broker a ceasefire through the French President Nicolas Sarkozy a bilateral agreement was reached where Russia would withdraw its troops from Georgia and the conflict areas. President Medvedev made things more prickly internationally by declaring that Russia would still recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as separate nations – which was quickly denounced by the United States as a breach in the ceasefire agreement to keep Georgia intact (including separatist regions).

The Russo-Georgian war showed the relationship between the 2 countries had finally tanked

Since the war, Russia has kept military bases and buffer zones close to the borders of Ossetia and Abkhazia and small violent conflicts have popped up close to the disputed areas.  Suffice it to say, Russo-Georgian relations remained very tense leading up to this year’s election of the Georgian Dream party and the rise of Prime Minister Ivanishvili.

So we’ve seen significant tension between Russia and Georgia over the years from:

• Russian centralized control in the 18th and 19th Century after Georgia sought protection from Turkey
• Anti-tsarist political activism from Western influences and a new working class
• Soviet control from Moscow and renewed nationalism
• Russian support for ethnic minority groups – leading to major conflicts
• Russian antagonism with American support for Georgia

Conclusion

Georgia’s history is long and tumultuous with several complicated trends.  Here are some things to keep in mind:

•  Georgia’s geographically diverse place on the map has made it an important (and desired) throughway and juncture in Eurasia.
• Georgia has consistently been under the influence and power of Russia, which it has vigorously tried to shrug off
• The Soviet era left a corrupt governing structure that has struggled to bring full democracy to the country.
• Ethnic conflicts have defined the last 30 years for Georgia, exposing its governing and international relations troubles.

What did Ivanishvili’s election mean for Georgia and its relationship with Russia?

Many Georgians felt that full democracy had failed to come quickly enough under Saakashvili and the use of extended executive power in addition to force to quell political protests hurt his party (the UNM). Though Saakashvili did allow the mayor of Tbilisi to be directly elected in 2010, this small democratic move did not placate the voters motivated by the Rose Revolution.

Ivanishvili, in addition to representing a fresh face, could bring something of an economic breath of fresh air.  Whether it wants to admit it or not, Georgia’s economy depends a great deal on trade with Russia -its biggest partner. Ivanishvili, a businessman who studied in Russia, recognizes this fact and is looking for a better relationship with Putin.

An about face from Ivanishvili?

Russia wants to be a major force in the Caucuses as it once was.  It is a strategic location, being on the precipice of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, and has an important port on the Black Sea. This is one of the reasons it has been involved in the ethnic conflicts within Georgia and why it has so vigorously opposed Saakashvili’s pro-NATO and pro-U.S. policies.  Russia does not want to see the U.S. be the only major player in the caucuses – it still sees itself as the extended empire it once was (at least economically).

Obviously, Saakashvili will still have significant influence over Georgian politics as President for the rest of the year, but the real question is: what will Ivanishvili choose?

Some hostility to Saakashvili, such as suggesting that he resign, and some arrests of former Saakashvili officials may signal dark clouds in the upcoming year, but in general terms, it seems that Mr. Ivanisvili is pro-business, pro-West, pro-Russia, and at least publicly, hoping to bring further democratic reform.

Given the interests of the U.S. in the region (read: oil pipeline & a caucus ally), you can bet President Obama is paying close attention to Ivanishvili’s actions and will want to at least attempt to keep Ivanishvili and Georgia from straying from its pro-NATO policies.

Now, if you’ll excuse me, ‘(POP!)’, it’s time to get to that wine.

Until the next Russian backed separatist movement,

Your Faithful historian,

Eric G. Prileson

Sources and further reads:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-russia-georgia-idUSBRE91402R20130205

http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/01/georgias-democracy

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/georgia/index.html?8qa

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ge0017)

http://themoscownews.com/business/20130204/191202163/Georgian-wines-to-return-to-Russia-in-spring–officials.html

http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/10/03/is-bidzina-ivanishvili-pro-russia-mikhail-saakashvili-and-his-surrogates-certainly-think-so/

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ge0019)

http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/02/can-the-south-caucasian-states-establish-themselves-as-independent-actors/

The Making of the Georgian Nation, Ronald Grigor Suny

What’s the Deal With Crop Subsidies and the Bio-fuels Dilemma?

Hello All!

Shareholders of “WTD” count on those pun subsidies

Welcome to another edition of “What’s the Deal?”, the blog that subsidizes its puns for comedic fuel.

In this week’s blog post, we’ll discuss an ongoing economic and socio-political issue: the subsidization of ethanol production from corn in the U.S.

Spoiler Alert: It turns out that using more corn for fuel instead of livestock feed or for human consumption causes the global price of corn to rise significantly.

We’ll take a look at the history of government support for farmers and crops and why this relatively recent focus on corn-based fuels took place and what impact it has on the world, especially on developing countries.

The Current

A year ago on January 1st, 2012 Congress voted to end the Federal tax credit for ethanol production from corn (known in the biz as the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit) - a tax credit that had lasted for 30 years.  Does this mean that the United States will move away from having 40% of its corn crop go to ethanol production and instead further food production?

Dianne Feinstein had to harvest quite a few votes to end the ethanol tax credit

The answer is unequivocally, no.

Even though the annual subsidy, which cost the Federal government ~$6 Billion in 2011, has ended, the EPA will still require an increasing proportion of ethanol blended in gasoline, and incentives still exist.  This means that at least the same amount of ethanol was produced in 2012 that was produced in 2011; the requirement just lacked the extra incentive.  The United States will also continue to subsidize agricultural commodities such as corn through price support; an American tradition since before the Great Depression.

Since the mid 2000s, the United States and many other rich countries have focused on producing and using an increasing amount of biofuels to blend with gasoline, mostly corn based ethanol (but includes the possibility of bacteria derived fuel), to reduce dependence on foreign oil and to curb greenhouse gas emissions.  But the focus on incentivizing ethanol is economic; certainly not in the specific interest of curbing climate change, though ethanol as an additive does help gasoline burn cleaner.

As long as using Ralstonia eutropha to produce isobutanol remains unscaled, we may be stuck in a biofuel maize

As a result of increased ethanol production in the U.S., an important study has shown that agriculture and the cost of food for developing countries has been impacted on a large scale.  Since the U.S. began to focus more on ethanol, the price of grain for human and livestock has risen significantly for importing countries and global prices became more sensitive to weather impacts, such as the 2012 drought.

Countries dependent on American food imports like Guatemala that use corn for a great deal of its diet, have become very sensitive to global food price impacts.  Farmers in Guatemala that had grown corn and other crops for generations suddenly found themselves without any internal demand for their products and their land became unsustainable.  In addition, local farms began to switch to crops that can be used as raw materials for biofuels such as palm and sugar cane.  Price shocks on corn like what happened this year severely impact the poor who must pay a greater proportion of their earnings for food.

A road median is sometimes the only land for corn cultivation available in Guatemala

Therefore, the concentration on ethanol production in the U.S. combined with over-production of corn in the states has had an indirect effect on the ability of people in developing countries to provide basic necessities.  To take a deeper look at the issues, we’ll look into the policy decisions of subsidizing farmers, ethanol production, and what further impacts may be in the future.

Keeping Farmers Afloat – The Subsidy Life Raft

Subsidies for crops are nothing new – Great Britain created trade barriers to protect corn for centuries with their English Corn Laws which weren’t repealed until 1846.  Paying farmers or keeping the price of crops at affordable levels for producers has been a staple activity for most countries.

Prime Minister Robert Peel was instrumental in repeeling the Corn Laws

Beginning before the Great Depression, U.S. federal support for farmers was initially a temporary measure, through the Grain Futures Act of 1922, the Agricultural Marketing Act, and the New Deal’s Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) – a life raft of revenue when prices were low and devastating droughts had afflicted much of the American “Bread Basket” in the 1920s.  The “life raft” nature of the law is showcased in the AAA bill as a “Declaration of Emergency” and was supposed to end when the President deemed that the “economic emergency” had lapsed.

Sure enough, the economic emergency ended following the Post-WWII economic surge, but crop subsidies in the U.S. did not lapse.

Farmers continued to need Federal support in the decades following the second world war because American agriculture continued to have the capacity to produce more than domestic and international markets could purchase.  Therefore, a surplus existed, lowering commodity prices and increasing the pressure on farmers – keeping the agricultural policy of the U.S. static.  Now, while the U.S. could “afford” to keep their farmers afloat, this was not the case for many other countries who began to import grains such as corn because it was cheaper than growing it themselves.

Maybe government subsidies would be more popular if there was music

Subsidies stuck around, albeit at a low level during the price spikes (and record profits for large farms) of the early 1970s, and became more relevant as a revenue source in the mid 1980s (during the farm crisis that spawned “Farm Aid”) and depended on into the 1990s and 2000s when subsidies accounted for nearly 47% of total farm income.  Suffice it to say then, that help for farmers from the Federal government has been a consistent policy for most of the 20th Century, and into the present.

Now, What’s All This Then About Eth’nol?

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is a federally mandated requirement that all gasoline contain a minimum standard amount of ethanol.  This provision was introduced in the 2005 U.S. Energy Policy Act and was expanded to contain a greater proportion of ethanol in the 2007 U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act.    Between 2005 and 2007, the percentage of ethanol in the RFS nearly doubled, and rose from 3% in 2005 to 10% in 2011.  In addition, the two laws required that the amount of ethanol (or other biofuels) produced increase each successive year, for example, requiring 9.2 billion gallons in 2008 and increasing to 13.2 billion gallons in 2012.

They’ll find the one of truth

The corn lobby (I know, I want to be a part of that lobby too) helped introduce bills requiring ethanol distilled from corn in the 1980s and 1990s but the bills never became law because ethanol as a motor fuel is less efficient than refined gasoline.  It is clear that without government support, ethanol would not have become a significant ingredient in gasoline.  A focus on gasoline additives that produced less smog (than MBTE) and curb climate change helped propel the two energy policy acts and ethanol, but the effort to reduce dependency on foreign fossil fuel use was also a key in the energy acts and the move to ethanol.

Now, both issues that the energy policy acts use as motives for the increase in ethanol production are questionable at best.   The effort of reducing dependency on foreign oil is questionable given that it takes fossil fuel use to produce ethanol (0.8 Btu’s to produce 1Btu of ethanol) – this contradiction may cause policy makers to rethink this specific motive of ethanol production.  Higher global prices and government incentives for ethanol production influence farmers in other countries to cultivate more land for crops and reduce potential carbon traps (aka, trees), so the ethanol effect of reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be offset. The effect on the global corn price by increased ethanol production should make lawmakers rethink the strategy as well.

This would be less controversial if we were just making whiskey

In estimating the effect on the price of corn from government mandated ethanol production, Carter, et al. conclude that corn prices would have been 30% lower between 2006 – 2010 if no increase in demand from ethanol production had occurred.  Below average harvests in 2010 and 2011 further depleted food stocks and 2012′s drought hampered corn production further, with the USDA reporting a 17% decrease in supplies on December 1, 2012.

In 2011, the net loss to the food system from corn‐ethanol production was about
3.3 percent of global grain production – enough of a jolt to the global price that corn, a staple in many diets in developing countries would not be affordable.

Conclusion: What’s the Incentive?

So, this tale comprises a story of the Federal government helping farmers by either paying  them or protecting the market value of their crops.  We also examined the effects of this long standing tradition to the present for a specific product, ethanol.

What we can conclude from our story is that:

• State subsidies and price protection for domestic farmers has been a tradition for a long time
  
• Ethanol was considered a potential fuel source for autos for some time, but was not actually implemented until 2005 as a result of a government mandate.
• The focus on ethanol has increased its volume in gasoline, but has resulted in less food production, higher global corn prices, and has been ineffective at achieving its goals of lower fossil fuel imports and greenhouse gas emissions.
• The indirect effect of the ethanol production push has been unsustainable corn prices for consumers in developing countries.

There are several tangents which we could explore from this topic including the debate over the proper role for government in mandating the use of ethanol (or biofuels), the implications for international trade from price-protection measures (such as in the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act), the controversial donation policy of surplus American food, and the negative diet and nutritive effects that come from subsidizing corn, but those would require separate analyses (and I don’t like corn that much).

Oh, who am I kidding, I love Corn!

For people whose diets consist heavily of corn based food items such as in Guatemala, a corn-importer, the ethanol mandates from the U.S. and Europe have severely squeezed the population by nearly doubling the price of corn.  This indirect effect of the ethanol mandate on global prosperity and health along with the lack of evidence of reduced dependence on fossil fuel and reduction of greenhouse gasses should make lawmakers look at what exactly the incentive really is for ethanol production.

With the 2012 Farm Bill recently extended, the ethanol issue will once again take a back seat issue for a year; but then again, most bills relating to agriculture don’t create as big a stir as other issues (because only 2% of us actually farm).  This does not mean this should be a back seat issue though.  The ethanol requirement deserves a revisit and its sunset should be considered given its controversial and adverse side effects.

Until the next distilled corn shot,

Your faithful historian,

Eric G. Prileson

http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/12-02WiseGlobalBiofuels.pdf

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/energy-environment/after-three-decades-federal-tax-credit-for-ethanol-expires.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/science/earth/in-fields-and-markets-guatemalans-feel-squeeze-of-biofuel-demand.html?pagewanted=all

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=fresh-fruit-hold-the-insulin

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AgriculturalSubsidyPrograms.html

http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/farmbills/1933.pdf

http://agecon.ucdavis.edu/people/faculty/aaron-smith/docs/Carter_Rausser_Smith_Ethanol_Paper_submit.pdf

http://www.epa.gov/regulations/laws/epa.html

http://www.agweb.com/blog/Farmland_Forecast_148/

What’s the Deal With a French Gesture in Algiers?

Hello All!

Who wouldn’t colonize html-land for its coding resources?

Welcome to another edition of What’s the Deal?”, the blog that rarely makes conciliatory remarks to its former colonies.

In this week’s post, we’ll discuss a trip to Algeria by the French President Francois Hollande and what it means in the context of the French-Algerian relationship.

The Current

On December 20th, French President Francois Hollande (don’t say “Francoy”) made a speech in Algiers, the capital of Algeria, that very nearly included an apology.

Its disappointing that we colonized the heck out of you, but I can’t say I’m sorry

Now, why would the President of France make such a speech to a North African Islamic country, you ask?

Hollande was acknowledging the destructive French legacy in Algeria, its former North African colony, and the brutal way in which the French army attempted to quell the uprising by Algerian nationalists in the 1940s and the ensuing war for independence between 1954 – 1962.   Hollande remarked on the 50th anniversary of Algerian independence,  ”I recognize here the suffering that colonialism inflicted on the Algerian people.”  Hollande also referenced the killings of unarmed Algerian protesters by French soldiers in 1945, saying the killings, “remained rooted in the minds of the Algerians and the French.”

Political Salt should be consumed sparingly

This somber, more realistic tone was a different sort of speech by Hollande than previous French Presidents who have tread carefully on the French-Algerian relationship, and chosen not to pronounce the French colonial impact on Algeria as directly.  His speech infuriated many hard-line conservatives in France who saw this as a soft gesture.  Hollande’s speech, though intent on improving diplomatic relations, should be taken with a grain of political salt.

Some Algerian commentators said the speech was motivated by the lackluster economic position of France, and the desire to boost trade relations between Paris and Algiers.  Algeria is the most populated French speaking nation (other than France) and is oil rich (12 billion barrels of reserves), yet trade with France only reaches 10 billion euros.  Hollande and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika agreed on reviving economic and cultural relations hoping to build on the announcement that the French car maker Renault is building an assembly plant near the Algerian city of Oran.

Francois and Abdelaziz: Tackling the economic downturn hand in hand

Other critics said the speech was purely a call for a pledge of military assistance in another former French African colony, Mali, where that country has suffered its second coup this year and is controlled in the North by the Islamic militant group Ansar al-Dine.  Hollande would like Algeria to assist an already-sanctioned force (AFISMA) from the UN Security Council, a role that the French are taking a lead in.

But similar to his predecessors, Hollande took the familiar French stance of not apologizing to Algeria for colonization or the atrocities of war saying he had not come, “to apologize or repent.”  The apology, not just recognition of the war and the negative effects of colonization, is what Algeria continues to push for.  The point of the speech for Hollande was a mixture of several different initiatives; he obviously needs to jumpstart the French economy, so improved trade with Algiers is a start, and to help improve economic ties, Hollande felt it necessary to improve overall diplomatic relations, hence the conciliatory speech as a gesture.

The French colonization of Algeria in 1830 and the war for Algerian independence continue to shape French-Algerian affairs to the present.  The cultural strife that exists between France’s Islamic immigrant population (many from Algeria) and indigenous Frenchmen remains a major issue that has erupted in recent years, such as the riots of 2005.  So as Hollande and French politicians look at immigration policies and improving ties with Algeria, they need to continue to keep in mind their long and tumultuous relationship.

C’est La Vie? Not After an Insult From Algiers

A stone’s throw* across the Mediterranean from France, Algeria was a French colony for 132 years (1830-1962), but, it should be remembered, had a long prosperous history and ancient cultural heritage preceding the colonial era including influence from the Roman Empire, several Imams of the Islamic expansion, and the Ottoman Empire.

The Almohads led the charge during the Islamic expansion across N. Africa

It would be a fascinating and deserving tale to discuss the rich history of solely the Algerians, but the context of this blog calls for a particular focus on the French-Algerian relationship and how this history influences the present.  So, as much as I would like to talk about the influence of Carthage and the conquest of Algiers by the Almohads, a more thorough look into Algeria’s history requires a separate venture.

*~468 miles

The French conquest of Algeria has a rather strange beginning; one that would, from a present perspective, seem perplexing.  After striking the French consul in the face with a fan during a meeting over debts, the Algerian Dey, or regent of the country, had mistakenly started what would become a 130 year colonial rule for Algeria and much of North Africa!

It wasn’t the French consul’s Dey

The act itself was insulting enough to the French as it was considered a direct insult to the French King Charles X, but the insulting process was a two-way street.  The reason the two were actually meeting was to actually discuss why France was unable to repay debts owed to Algeria (from the revolution and Napoleonic era).  The dey of Algeria, Husayn, found it insulting himself that the French had little response to the debts they owed Algeria, and thus the fan normally used for temporarily cooling thus served to inflame tempers.

Immediately, France attempted a naval blockade of Algiers, but this three-year long effort was ineffective against Algeria’s many privateers and led the French to launch a military expedition in 1830 that by 1848, had ceded control of most of Northern Algeria to the French.  In addition, France set out to control further territory in North Africa and by the 1870s had significant control in Tunisia (helped by the Congress of Berlin) and gained a foothold in Morocco by the early 20th Century (collectively called the Maghreb Territory).

The new French government of the 2nd Republic in 1848 under Napoleon III, instituted a system of civilian government in Algeria administered under three departements (or local administrations).  This civilian government was dominated by and elite group of French colonists, who were popularly known as pied noirs (Black Feet) and controlled the colony’s wealth while restraining any attempts towards democratic reform.

A revolt against French colonial administration in 1870 by a Sufi-Islamic family led by Al-Muqrani attempted to take advantage of the French defeat as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, but the revolt was crushed by the French army, and the native Algerians were marginalized further as land was opened up further to European development.

Algerians were not on the fence when it came to militarily supporting France

After supporting the French during WWI (both militarily and administratively), winds of nationalism began fervently among Muslim strongholds, but the French did not relinquish their political power in the colony.

The Manifesto of the Algerian People of 1943 demanded an Algerian constitution that guaranteed political participation and legal freedoms for native Algerians.  Instead of losing their political power in the colony, France only extended French citizenship (and therefore political rights) to a small population of Algerians.  Another Algerian protest movement following the end of WWII in Europe was brutally suppressed, killing many thousands of unarmed Muslims (this is the killing that Hollande mentioned in his speech).

Further diplomatic measures to slowly move towards granting political power to Algerians continued to be suppressed by the pied noir such as rejection of the Organic Statute of Algeria, which called for an Congressional Assembly made up of both Algerians and French colonists.  Through both political and military muscle, Algerians were kept as second class citizens.

So, the French controlled Algeria through

• an elite group of French colonists, not Algerians
• Marginalization of Muslims and religious politics
• strong-arm tactics against any opposition

Independence: A Brutal Fight 1954-1962

The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN- Front de Liberation Nationale) began as a guerilla fighting force, but soon evolved into an elite fighting force and political body.  The war itself was peppered with massacres and counter-massacres on both sides- from the Algerian Nationalists and the French Army and their pied noir gangs.  For example, in 1955, after a massacre of civilians by the FLN, a retaliatory effort resulted in the bloodletting of 12,000 Muslims killed.  While the violent repression from the French through colonialism continued in their effort to put down the revolution, its important to know that the FLN took part in the violence as well – it was certainly not a peaceful protest movement.

the French Algerian war still burns deep

The “War” as it really was, was not officially labeled as such by the French government until 1999;  officially from the French government, it was a “pacification” against Algeria’s nationalists.

Facing international pressure (from the self-determination and anti-colonial movements after WWII) and after facing an internal coup from armed forces influenced by the colonists in Algeria, President Charles DeGaulle in 1961 decided to abandon the pied noir support (something previous French leaders had been loath to do) and reopened talks with the FLN to negotiate a peace, through the Evian Accords.  Meanwhile, police in Paris fired on Algerian independence protesters in the capital, killing scores.

The following year in 1962, out of a possible 6.5 million voters, 6 million Algerians voted for an independence referendum, creating the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria.

Quenching the thirst of Algerian political freedom advocates

But though the Algerian’s had their own republic, their relationship as a people remained intertwined with France.  Many difficulties awaited new governance and the economy as most of the pied noir left in a mass exodus following the Evian Accords – which only allowed former colonists to remain as French citizens for 3 years before becoming full fledged Algerians – newly minted minorities.  This exodus left much of the administration, land, and power positions up for grabs – not to mention the physical destruction left by the war.

This situation prompted Premier Ahmed Ben Bella to nationalize industries and form a powerful triumvirate at the Algerian helm: the army, the nationalist party, and the government.  This effort was effective at modernizing Algeria through their oil revenues, but only as long as the global economy cooperated.  The need to consolidate industries became a struggle to limit government’s power and allow for political opposition in the 2 decades following independence.  For example, the first constitution approved in 1963 contained no executive limits of power for Ben Bella, and rebellions in 1965 and 1988 were put down with armed force.  Algeria’s subsequent constitutions and leaders failed to jumpstart a struggling economy, stemming from the global oil crisis of the 1970s -80s and Islamic activism that resulted.

Ciao Ben Bella! Ahmed Ben Bella was eventually forced out of office through a non-violent coup

Political changes in 1989 led to a new constitution that strayed from the political ideals of the FLN by getting rid of nominal socialism and declaring significant freedoms of expression, meeting, and association (notably ousting previously declared rights for women).

The political changes were only on the surface, however, after the incumbent President since 1979, Colonel Chadli Benjadid, realized that the newly formed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party (previously blocked for being a political party related to a religious group) would win majorities in parliament and dissolved parliament.  The ruling FLN, the only political party to rule Algeria since independence, couldn’t allow its powers to be diminished; eerily similar to the pied noir before them.  Algeria once again became an emergency state curbing Islamic protesters and students who clamored for a return to the political process.  The civil conflict between the ruling Algerian military and Islamic opposition groups in the 1990s claimed as many as 150,000 lives.   Ironically, the FLN that used Islamism as a unifying force against the Christian French colonizers during the war for independence was now using the threat of Islamism to crack down on demonstrations for a fair political process.

When elections were finally held again  in 1999, parties affiliated with a religion were once again banned and Presidential powers were expanded.  In a largely flawed election, the current President, Abdelziz Bouteflika was elected with 70% of the vote.  To his credit, Bouteflika set out to pardon many Islamic rebels from the conflict; a proposition which was taken by up to 80% of the eligible recipients, stabilizing much of the country by reducing much (but not all) of the political violence.  Bouteflika was rewarded with reelection in 2004 after taking an effort that stabilized much of the country.

Islamist movements in Algeria to this day see the influence of religion as a necessary tool to remove corruption and lack of respect for human rights from the FLN run government.  So far, Bouteflika has continued to use the military to crack down on Islamist movements who wish to unseat his government.

Parisian suburbia

Meanwhile, the scores of Algerian immigrants in France have endured discrimination, are largely segregated, and  are disproportionately poor.  This situation, along with anti-Islamic policies from French conservatives has caused violent upheavals such as the 2005 Paris riots.  A legacy of colonialism has left Algerians on both sides of the Mediterranean in repressive situations.

Conclusion

For over 130 years, Algerians only knew one way of ruling a country and that was with a strong ruling elite and a weak civil society.  The Algerian government under Bouteflika, is largely still a carbon copy of those French colonial predecessors:

• The FLN continues its hold on the Presidency, with expanded executive powers, including the military as the right hand.
• In effect, the one-party rule of the FLN since independence is an extension of the French colonial rule through the pied noir and military.
•  France has an uneasy relationship with Muslim immigrants stemming from their colonial relationship over Algeria and the Maghreb.

So, we can see from the extent and brutality of the French colonial legacy in Algeria why President Hollande approached his speech in December so delicately.  Having lived himself in independent Algeria, Hollande saw first hand how repression reverberated from 1830 through the war for independence.

Hollande though certainly recognizes that no apology can make up for the horrors and brutal legacy of the French colonial rule in Algeria; but since Algeria has insisted on one, and Hollande would prefer a deeper economic connection, perhaps a deeper gesture than just a condolence would be appropriate.

Coming to grips with the colonial legacy

Neither country can sweep what happened during the war under the rug, but at least the French aren’t pretending like it was merely a “pacification” anymore.  Better efforts to integrate and improve lives for Muslim Frenchmen would be a good start along with disallowing xenophobic French political groups with an intolerance for Islam.

Increased economic activity and trade would certainly benefit both the recession-prone French and the Hydro-carbon bound Algerians, but full scale relations will probably remain wary for some time.

50 years may have passed since the end of the war for independence, but 130 years of colonial rule still rings deep in an Algeria still searching for its own identity.

Until the next slap in the face leads to conquest,

Your faithful historian,

Eric G. Prileson

Sources and Further Reads:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/world/europe/hollande-uses-softer-tone-on-delicate-visit-to-algeria.html?ref=europe&_r=0

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/20/algeria-france-idUSL5E8NK6F320121220

http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/12/2012122184854340467.html

http://www.danielpipes.org/7/france-and-algeria-a-history-of-decolonization

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/h%3Cspan%20class=’pullme’%3EIn%20short,%20when%20you%20empower%20a%20woman,%20you%20change%20the%20world%3C/span%3Ettp://www.unfpa.org/story.asp?NewsID=43827&Cr=+mali+&Cr1=#.UNzSGG_s4gw

http://www.economist.com/node/21542171

http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/13/algeria-the-obstacles-to-democracy/

http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Algeria.pdf

What’s the Deal With All These Global Maritime Disputes?

Hello All!

Unlike fractals, I only repeat myself once in a while

Welcome to another edition of “What’s the Deal?”, the blog that doesn’t repeat itself that often.

In this week’s post we’ll discuss the continuing squabbles in different coastal regions of the world over water boundaries and country ownership.  If this subject seems familiar to our massive* readership, it should be because I wrote about the dispute in the South China Sea earlier this year.  But never fear, I’m not running out of ideas!

This overlapping post merely continues the discussion over maritime laws and political disagreements on a global scale and puts the current disputes and debates into context.

*Note: massive is subjective

The Current

Islands both geographically and politically

On November 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague ruled on a dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia over who had sovereignty over a region in the Caribbean Sea.  The ICJ (after a 10 year process) drew a new maritime boundary that grants Nicaragua a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from its Eastern coast while leaving small islands within the EEZ in the possession of Colombia (see map).

While Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega gleefully extolled the decision and sent his navy to patrol Nicaragua’s newly granted territory, Colombia’s reaction was markedly the opposite.  Juan Manuel Santos, the Colombian President, refused to recognize the ICJ ruling, saying it was filled with mistakes and argued that treaties, not the ICJ, should be the legal avenue to resolving territorial disputes.  Santos on November 30 said that Colombia would no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ (which legally does nothing for Colombia’s claims).  Santos has so far refused to withdraw the Colombian navy, but aggression between Nicaragua and Colombia is unlikely, especially following the cordial meeting between Ortega and Santos in Mexico City on December 1st.

This ruling by the ICJ is being closely monitored elsewhere in Latin America because Chile and Peru are also facing off over maritime boundaries.  A 38,000 sq. km area with a rich fishing stock is becoming an issue because though Chile has long controlled the area, Peru says the maritime border and claim were never officially defined.

Maybe if they could agree on one name for the islands, the dispute would be resolved

Meanwhile, tensions between Japan and China have risen significantly this year over the rights to the islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkakus to the Japanese and the Diayous to the Chinese.   The row intensified in September when the Japanese government paid $26 million to their private owner for the three islands in the archipelago that Japan didn’t own, prompting a fierce response from Chinese diplomats and press.  A nationalistic rally from the Chinese public followed with significant protests along with boycotts and destruction of Japanese businesses.

Neighboring countries and the world have looked on with a concerned eye as China sent surveillance and naval ships to the waters around the area; raising the stakes for the potential for conflict.  At the same time, Japanese diplomats and politicians have been stirring popular nationalism as well, such as controversially visiting a WWII memorial.  While the hot stove issue has cooled off in recent weeks, many see this problem as another example of Chinese aggression and military expansion.

Looking into the troubled Sino-Japanese relations

But there’s more than meets the eye here.

While China has looked to expand its maritime and international muscle, it is also seeking to balance their own territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which are significantly smaller than Japan’s.  China feels that Japan received an unfair distribution of maritime territory in the treaties following WWII.  In addition, China holds its own historical claims to the islands and is also seeking potential resources, which the rocks may hold.

So what we have here are three examples of squabbles of maritime sovereignty but that also have political, national, and economic motives.  These incidents in 2012 follow the continuing dispute in the South China Sea and are probably going to continue to turn up in increasing numbers in the years to come.   So what better time to try and understand the underlying issues and long term implications than right now, right?

From the Caribbean to the East China Sea, we’ll look at the background on these issues and see what they mean globally.

Historical Claims and Political Gains #1: A Fair Treaty?

The Colombia-Nicaragua territorial spat goes back to the ending days of Spanish colonial dominance in Central America when Colombia gained independence in 1822.  A federation in Latin America called the United Provinces of Central America (UPCA) did not recognize Colombia’s claim to the islands off the Nicaraguan coast, and neither did the resulting state of Nicaragua when the UPCA dissolved in civil war in 1834.

Colombia’s extension into the Caribbean w/ Panama makes their island claims more reasonable; at least back in the 19th century

Of course, Colombia back in the 19th century looked a bit different than its modern borders suggest.  Colombia owned what is now Panama up until 1895 when an American backed revolt against Colombia brought Panamanian independence.  So, with an extra isthmus of land in Central America, Colombia’s claim to the islands makes more geographic sense.

The crux of the maritime dispute, however, lies with the controversial Esguerra-Barcenas Treaty between Colombia and Nicaragua in 1928 which granted the islands of San Andres and Providencia to Colombia along with a generous portion of nautical territory that included several islets within the disputed area.

The issue was not just that Nicaragua emerged a territorial loser in the treaty, but that Colombia had won with the strict backing of the United States.  The U.S. had been involved publicly and clandestinely in Nicaragua between 1909 and 1933.  Nicaraguan-American relations soured when Nicaragua, under President Jose Santos Zelaya, offered generous contracts to Germany and Japan to build a competing canal to the Panama canal.  (The U.S. was initially going to build the canal in Nicaragua, but heavy lobbying from business interests against this route changed the location to Panama).  This effort from the Zelaya administration caused a break in diplomatic relations with the U.S. while at the same time, a civil war erupted in Nicaragua between pro-Zelaya and anti-government movements.  The U.S. sent 400 marines to the coast to secure their interests, a contingent force that would remain in Nicaragua continuously between 1912-1933.

After not supporting American business interests, the U.S. told Zelaya to vaya

With the U.S. troops remaining in Nicaragua and several treaties hindering Nicaragua’s ability to intervene against American business interests (see Chamarro-Bryan Treaty), Nicaragua essentially became an American protectorate.  The U.S. used this influence to bring conservative, American business friendly leaders to power including the dictator Anastachio Somoza Garcia in 1937.

At the same time, the Nicaraguan government dealt with a troublesome rebel-liberal force under Agusto Cesar Sandino, a nationalist who denounced the American intervention and subsequent conservative governments.  The Nicaraguan government that signed the maritime treaty with Colombia in 1928 was heavily influenced by the United States, and the U.S. may have wished to grant more influence in the Caribbean to the more stable Colombian government instead of the conflict-riddled and potentially unfriendly environment in Nicaragua.

American troops in Nicaragua – a commanding presence

When the Sandinista rebels (named after the aforementioned Sandino) overthrew the Garcia reign, and took power in 1980 (and prevented an American backed coup by the Contra rebels), they renounced the Esguerra-Barcenas Treaty because of the U.S. influence involved in Nicaragua signing the treaty.  Therefore, Nicaragua has assumed the claim to the same territory that Colombia “legally” had through the treaty.  Colombia asserts that the final ratification, in 1930, was sufficiently past the point of American intervention and therefore should continue to be valid.  But, U.S. troops didn’t officially leave Nicaragua until January 1933, so Nicaragua may have a point in saying that the U.S. forced their hand in signing the treaty.

Nicaragua filed claims in 2001 with the ICJ to remove the “legal uncertainties” around the maritime boundaries between Colombia’s territorial claims versus the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the international convention that updated maritime laws) – which of course was just decided on Nov. 19th.

Historical Claims and Political Gains #2: Historical vs. Legal

I don’t think anybody wants to rattle this sabre.. it looks rusty

While China may have historical precedent to ownership of the uninhabited Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, legal technicalities may override their precedent.  Let’s review both sides of this complicated legal issue that has led to the dispute and sabre rattling.  Two op-ed pieces from a Chinese and Japanese scholar explore the issues, and I relay their main points here.

According to Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) records in China, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands lied within Chinese borders, and Japan recognized China’s ownership of the islands in the 19th Century.  Prior to Japan’s acquisition of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands after the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan in the Meiji period had recognized the islands as territory of China.  For example, during surveys of East China Sea islands by Japan in 1885, the Japanese foreign minister acknowledged referred specifically to islands next to Taiwan “belonging to China.” Further, the first citizen to lease the islands from the Japanese government, Koga Tatsushiro, wrote that Japan had acquired the islands through the “gallant military victory of our imperial forces.”  So, Japan assumed ownership through the spoils of war in 1895, not through historical possession.

Beauty, in the spoils of war

Both Taiwan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were under Japanese occupation during WWII, but per post-WWII conditions, Japan was required to surrender territories gained through aggression and revert them to their pre-1895 legal status: Chinese for the Senkakus.

Game over, right?  Per historical precedent, China should be rewarded with the Diaoyu islands right?  Well, unfortunately, it’s not that simple (and Japan contests this historical argument).  A more recent legal precedent may give Japan the legal ownership.

According to an article from the People’s Daily in 1953, the mouthpiece of the Communist Leadership in China, China demanded that the Ryukyu Islands (which included the Senkaku) which in the 1950s were under American administration, be allowed self-determination with an option for returning to Japanese administration.

Ah yes, the common law doctrine of estoppel… just doing some light reading on that

Judging a current Chinese claim that the Diaoyu/Senkakus should be theirs then would look at that claim and say that China was allowing for self-determination for the Ryukyu islands (with the Senkaku) and had given up their claim.  Therefore, the common law doctrine of estoppel (a principle used by the ICJ in prior island disputes) would take precedent, stating that,

“the law precludes a party from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied.”

So, basically, since China had called for self-determination of the islands prior to 1970 and not Chinese ownership (essentially disowning the islands), they can’t now call the islands Chinese.  Japan also asserts that China only made the claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands after oil deposits were discovered.  Therefore, if the case over ownership were to come to an international court, the court would rule in favor of Japanese ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkakus.

But there are some problems with this second argument from the Japanese scholar.  First, the evidence cited for the Chinese call for self-determination of the Ryukyu islands is an article in the People’s Daily.  Even though the People’s Daily is edited to give the Communist Party’s line, it is still an article in a newspaper, not an official governmental proclamation.  Therefore, it may be difficult to use this as evidence as disownership.  Second, the article doesn’t even state an option for a return to Japanese administration; it merely states the demand for self-determination.

International Rulings and Their Global Implications

The ICJ’s ruling in the Caribbean over Nicaragua’s newly won maritime borders closely follows the rules laid down in the UNCLOS for an economic exclusive zone (EEZ) which grants Nicaragua jurisdiction over the resources of some 38 million square nautical miles of ocean space.  To the coastal State (Nicaragua, in this case) falls the right to exploit, develop, manage and conserve all resources – fish or oil, gas or gravel, nodules or sulfur – to be found in the waters, on the ocean floor and in the subsoil of an area extending 200 nautical miles from its shore.  The coastal state is required to allow transient navigation and abide by environmental conservation laws.

A cross sectional view of an EEZ

Colombia, who for the most part has shown significant respect for international laws was upset with the ICJs decision mostly because the EEZ granted to Nicaragua surrounds two Colombian islands: San Andres and Providencia and their archipelagos.  In addition, Colombia probably didn’t want to lose out on the current and potential resources that the maritime zone offers.  As stated earlier though, Colombia and Nicaragua’s leaders have met and promised to work things out, with or without international organization.

Colombia’s reaction of refusing to recognize the ICJ rulings may be a pattern, however, for further maritime disputes that arrive down the road.  The Peruvian-Chilean dispute over a coastal fishing region is one, but as fishing stocks dwindle and newly found oil pops up in previously unforeseen locations, the need for international codifications rises significantly.

As we continue to see in the South China Sea dispute, the potential for American intervention and some sort of large-power conflict exists.  Given the mutual defense treaty between Japan and the U.S. and the American desire to keep freedom of navigation in all waters, American intervention over the Senkaku/Diaoyu flare-up was a conversation piece up until recently.  A provisional compromise has been a short term solution and kept tempers cooler, but is not a long term solution for the dispute.

Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone; quite large, no?

Like the Caribbean territorial issues, island and maritime boundary disputes in the Pacific and elsewhere show the continued need for international oversight.  China should consider filing a claim to gain a larger EEZ or to challenge Japan’s current maritime boundaries which are quite large despite their lack of coastline mileage.  A judicial ruling hopefully would be expedited a bit faster than the decade-long Nicaraguan claim, but this is certainly a better outcome for all parties than any sort of military conflict.

Conclusion: Bring Your Legal Pad

With these two territorial issues, we’ve seen some patterns:

• Territorial gains via military campaign or political instability
  
• Uncertain or disputed historical ownership
• American intervention has played a huge role: influencing Nicaragua’s signing of the Esguerra-Barcenas Treaty and in mediating Japan’s military acquisition in the post-WWII period
• The huge implications that these squabbles can have if left unresolved and  the influence they have on future disputes.

It is certainly safe to say that the issue of countries shouting for control over slightly exposed, uninhabited rocks is not going away anytime soon.

Speaking of shouting…

In the Senkaku/Diaoyu squabble, nationalistic demonstrations and political stances have taken center stage from both China and Japan.  Japan’s purchase of the final three Senkaku islands along with recently reelected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visiting a WWII military shrine, have not only showed increased nationalism from Japan, but only inflamed feelings in China.

Some worry Mr. Abe will resort to fisticuffs with China

The politicization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute can only worry international bodies and the U.S.  Further, the recent elections in Japan which have brought Mr. Abe back into power as the PM in the Diet (Japanese Parliament) has worried peace keepers and China that “China hawks” in power in Japan will not be good news for the island dispute.  Meanwhile, the newly installed leader of the Communist Party, Xi Jinping, has made a clear appeal to popular nationalism through his effort to bring about the “revival of the Chinese nation.”

Making a ruling on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute won’t be easy, but it certainly would set a precedent.  Perhaps this would set the table for a resolution for the more dangerous squabble in the South China Sea.

As more countries realize the economic and political potential of their coastal areas, the more disputes will likely surface.  We can only hope that international law is respected and that they bring their legal pads.

Until my own EEZ is granted,

Your Faithful Historian,

Eric G. Prileson

Sources and Further Reads:

http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21567986-colombia-smarts-loss-territorial-waters-islet-sea

http://www.economist.com/node/21562987

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/a-mixed-ruling-for-a-caribbean-dispute.html

http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-diaoyusenkaku-islands/

http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/the-diaoyusenkaku-islands-a-japanese-scholar-responds/

http://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/10.htm

http://www.munuc.org/munucxvii/pdfs/ICJ_A.pdf

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm

Overthrow! America’s Century of Regime Change, Stephen Kinzer